Classic Poem

I--PLAN OF A TREATISE ON MORALS

That great science which regards nature and the operations of
the human mind, is popularly divided into Morals and Metaphysics.
The latter relates to a just classification, and the assignment
of distinct names to its ideas; the former regards simply the
determination of that arrangement of them which produces the greatest
and most solid happiness. It is admitted that a virtuous or moral
action, is that action which, when considered in all its accessories
and consequences, is fitted to produce the highest pleasure to the
greatest number of sensitive beings. The laws according to which
all pleasure, since it cannot be equally felt by all sensitive
beings, ought to be distributed by a voluntary agent, are reserved
for a separate chapter.

The design of this little treatise is restricted to the development
of the elementary principles of morals. As far as regards that
purpose, metaphysical science will be treated merely so far as a
source of negative truth; whilst morality will be considered as a
science, respecting which we can arrive at positive conclusions.

The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the ascertaining of
what IS NOT TRUE, the principal direct service which metaphysical
science can bestow upon moral science. Moral science itself is the
doctrine of the voluntary actions of man, as a sentient and social
being. These actions depend on the thoughts in his mind. But there
is a mass of popular opinion, from which the most enlightened persons
are seldom wholly free, into the truth or falsehood of which it
is incumbent on us to inquire, before we can arrive at any firm
conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the
regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow beings; or before
we can ascertain the elementary laws, according to which these
thoughts, from which these actions flow, are originally combined.

The object of the forms according to which human society is administered,
is the happiness of the individuals composing the communities which
they regard, and these forms are perfect or imperfect in proportion
to the degree in which they promote this end.

This object is not merely the quantity of happiness enjoyed by
individuals as sensitive beings, but the mode in which it should
be distributed among them as social beings. It is not enough, if
such a coincidence can be conceived as possible, that one person
or class of persons should enjoy the highest happiness, whilst
another is suffering a disproportionate degree of misery. It is
necessary that the happiness produced by the common efforts, and
preserved by the common care, should be distributed according to
the just claims of each individual; if not, although the quantity
produced should be the same, the end of society would remain
unfulfilled. The object is in a compound proportion to the quantity
of happiness produced, and the correspondence of the mode in which
it is distributed, to the elementary feelings of man as a social
being.

The disposition in an individual to promote this object is called
virtue; and the two constituent parts of virtue, benevolence and
justice, are correlative with these two great portions of the only
true object of all voluntary actions of a human being. Benevolence
is the desire to be the author of good, and justice the apprehension
of the manner in which good ought to be done.

Justice and benevolence result from the elementary laws of the
human mind.